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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF DIRECT
DEMOCRACY PARTICIPANTS VERSUS THE STATE'S INTEREST IN REGULATING
THE ELECTION PROCESS. BUCKLEY V AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
FOUNDATION, INC, 119 S. Ct. 636 (1999).
I. INTRODUCTION
The balance between a state's interest in regulating its election process
and the interest of individual citizens in effectively campaigning for public
issues they support is a delicate one. Like many other types of laws regulating
speech, election laws have often been challenged on First Amendment
grounds. Because the processes ofdirect democracy are theoretically intended
to be conducted by the people, governmental regulation of the process is
particularly controversial. For instance, Arkansas recently experienced
political turbulence surrounding a proposed ballot initiative in its last general
election.' Like the attempt to eliminate property taxes in Arkansas, controver-
sial issues are often the focus of direct democracy campaigns.2 Confronted
with numerous state imposed regulations, the active participants of direct
democracy are sometimes forced to defend their fundamental rights, including
the First Amendment right of free speech.
This note will examine one of the United States Supreme Court's most
recent decisions involving this tenuous area of First Amendment law: Buckley
v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc.3  Buckley involved a
challenge to a Colorado statute that purported to govern the procedure of
initiative petitioning in the State. Part I of the note will examine the
circumstances that led to the lawsuit between Colorado's Secretary of State
Victoria Buckley and the American Constitutional Law Foundation. Part III
will set out the precedent that formed the basis for the Buckley decision. In
Part IV, the note will discuss the Buckley Court's reasoning, and Part V will
address the significance of the Buckley decision, including how the decision
may affect Arkansas.
1. Proposed constitutional Amendment 4 provoked controversy during Arkansas's 1998
general election. See Roberts v. Priest, 334 Ark. 503, 509-10, 975 S.W.2d 850, 851-52 (1998).
Amendment 4, which was the result of an initiative petition drive, sought to eliminate the ad
valorem property tax in Arkansas. See id. at 509, 975 S.W.2d at 851.
2. See Richard B. Collins & Dale Oesterle, Structuring the Ballot Initiative: Procedures
That Do and Don't Work, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 47, 49 (1995). At least according to public
perception, initiative petition drives usually concentrate on controversial measures. See id.
3. 119 S. Ct. 636 (1999).
UALR LAW REVIEW
II. FACTS
In 1993, Respondent American Constitutional Law Foundation4 (ACLF)
and several individuals sued Colorado's Secretary of State, challenging the
constitutionality of certain aspects of legislation regulating Colorado's
initiative5 and referendum6 processes in the state.7 Before filing suit, the
plaintiffs sought to repeal through referendum the recently proposed
legislation regulating direct democracy procedures.' Colorado's Secretary of
State denied the referendum request, however, relying on the Senate's
inclusion of a "safety clause" in the bill.9 ACLF and the individual plaintiffs
then brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,"° claiming that the regulations
4. The American Constitutional Law Foundation (ACLF) is a nonprofit organization
concerned primarily with direct democracy. The group is composed of members of differing
political affiliations, all bound by the common thread of their involvement in the petition and
referendum processes. See Brief for Respondents American Constitutional Law Foundation,
Inc., Craig Eley, Jack Hawkins, Lonnie Haynes, and Alden Kautz at 4 n.3, Buckley v. ACLF,
119 S. Ct. 636 (1999) (No. 97-930).
5. "An electoral process by which a percentage of voters can propose legislation and
compel a vote on it by the legislature or by the full electorate; recognized in some state
constitutions, the initiative is one of the few methods of direct democracy in an otherwise
representative system." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 315 (Abr. 6th ed. 1990).
6. "1. The process of referring state legislative acts or state constitutional amendments
to the people for final approval by popular vote. 2. A vote taken by this method." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 530 (Abr. 6th ed. 1990).
7. See Buckley, 11 9 S. Ct. at 640.
8. See id. Colorado's legislature passed a law that imposed a number of regulations on
the initiative and referendum processes, including limitations on the time period a petition can
be circulated, requirements concerning the disclosure of identities of those who circulate
petitions and those who pay for the circulations, and requirements that circulators be at least
eighteen years of age and registered voters. See id.
9. American Constitutional Law Found., Inc. v. Meyer, 120 F.3d 1092, 1097 (10th Cir.
1997). A safety clause precludes further review by referendum and may be included when
legislation is deemed "necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or
safety." Id. at 1096.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
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violated the First 1 and Fourteenth 2 Amendments to the United States
Constitution. 3
Respondents complained of six specific limitations proposed by the
Colorado legislation.' 4 First, ACLF challenged the requirement that all
petition circulators be at least eighteen years of age.'5 Second, the organiza-
tion challenged the requirement that all petition circulators be registered
voters.'6 Third, ACLF took issue with the restriction imposed by the state
legislature limiting the maximum circulation period for petitions to six
months. 7  Fourth, ACLF contested the constitutionality of requiring
circulators to wear identification badges stating their name, volunteer or paid
status, and if paid, the employer's name and telephone number. 8 Fifth, the
complainants challenged the requirement that each petitioner sign an affidavit
certifying his knowledge and understanding of the laws pertinent to petition-
ing.'9 Finally, ACLF questioned the constitutionality of the state's require-
ment of a disclosure statement revealing the names of paid circulators and the
amount of money each is paid.2°
ACLF's primary contention was that each of these regulations violated
the First Amendment by having a chilling effect on core political speech.2'
For example, Bill Orr, who was the executive director of ACLF, claimed
injury caused by the voter registration requirement.22 He argued that not
registering to vote is a form of political speech in and of itself.2 3 ACLF
11. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion. or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12. The Fourteenth Amendment states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.






19. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 640.
20. See id. at 641.
21. See Brief for Respondent ACLF at 12-25, Buckley (No. 97-930).
22. See Brief of Respondents David Aitken, Jon Baraga. and Bill Orr, as the Parent and




pointed out that the First Amendment guarantees free speech to all citizens,
not exclusively those who choose to register to vote. 4 With regard to the
minimum age requirement, William David Orr, a minor who sued individually
through his father Bill Orr, complained that despite his desire and physical
ability to circulate petitions regarding educational issues important to him, he
was not permitted to do so because of the state regulations.25
ACLF member Jon Baraga, who had previously circulated petitions for
the Colorado Hemp Initiative, specifically challenged the validity of the
identification badge requirement.26  Baraga stressed the importance of
anonymity when campaigning for controversial issues, explaining that he had
been harassed by law enforcement officials when he circulated petitions
seeking the legalization of marijuana 7.2  Respondents also asserted that the
sixth month limit imposed on the circulation of petitions was an arbitrary and
unreasonable burden on free speech. 2' They further argued that the criminal
and civil penalties imposed for a petitioner's failure to sign the required
affidavit made this requirement void for vagueness because it was not clear
exactly what the petitioner should know and understand about the law.29
ACLF also argued that the disclosure requirement was overbroad because the
names of all paid petitioners must be disclosed regardless of the amount they
were paid and that the requirement was intrusive because it chilled the speech
of paid petitioners. 30 In contrast, the State contended that each of the
regulations was necessary to prevent abuse and fraud that may occur in the
direct democracy process and that any burden on speech was minimal and
necessary due to the compelling state interest of preventing such abuse and
fraud.31
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado upheld the
provisions that required a minimum age for petitioners, required petitioners
to sign an affidavit, required petitioners to be registered voters, and required
a six month maximum circulation period for petitions.32 However, the district
court held that the identification badge and disclosure requirements were
unconstitutional.33 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
24. See Brief for Respondent ACLF at 17, Buckley (No. 97-930).
25. See Prose Respondent Bill Orr's Brief at 40, Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. 636 (1999)
(No. 97-930).
26. See id. at 19.
27. See id.
28. See American Constitutional Law Found., Inc. v. Meyer, 120 F.3d 1092, 1098 (1 0th
Cir. 1997).
29. See id. at I106.
30. See Brief for Respondent ACLF at 24, Buckley (No. 97-930).
31. See Petitioner's Brief at 15-17, Buckley v. ACLF, 119 S. Ct. 636 (1999) (No. 97-930).
32. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 641.
33. See id. at 642.
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Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's approval of the minimum age,
affidavit, and six month circulation period requirements.34 It also affirmed the
trial court's rejection of the identification badge and disclosure
requirements.35 Unlike the district court, however, the appellate court held
that the requirement that petition circulators be registered voters was an
unnecessary burden on political speech.36
The United States Supreme Court granted Colorado Secretary of State
Buckley's writ of certiorari to decide whether these state regulations of direct
democracy unduly inhibited core political speech as protected by the First
Amendment.37 The Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit, ruling that the voter
registration, six month limitation, identification badge, and disclosure
requirements were undue restrictions on speech, while the minimum age and
affidavit requirements were acceptable.
III. BACKGROUND
This background section begins with a brief examination of the recent
history of First Amendment jurisprudence as defined by the Supreme Court,
touching on the basic distinctions in the various types of protected speech.
Next, the focus shifts to First Amendment law as applicable to election
procedures. The remainder ofthe background compares regulations governing
candidate elections to regulations of direct democracy procedures.
A. A Brief Summary of Basic First Amendment Principles
The First Amendment protects a broad array of speech and conduct that
arises out of various facts and circumstances. First Amendment doctrine is
often referred to as "freedom of speech" or "freedom of expression." Despite
its presence throughout the history of the United States, the First Amend-





37. See Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1033 (1998).
38. See generally JEREMY COHEN, CONGRESS SHALL MAKE No LAW: OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING (1989). One of the first
occasions where the Court decided a First Amendment issue was Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919). Challenges to laws prohibiting speaking out against the government, such as
the Espionage Act of 1917, ignited a spark forcing the Court to begin creating precedent for
future First Amendment cases.
1999]
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Since the early 1900s, the Court has granted certiorari in a substantial
number of cases involving First Amendment issues.39 Today's First
Amendment decisions are the product of decades spent developing complex
multi-pronged tests that are used to determine the constitutionality of
restrictions imposed on communication. The analysis of the early speech
cases appears rather rudimentary in comparison.4" In evaluating the constitu-
tionality of statutes aimed at regulating speech, the Court looks at several
factors. A primary consideration is whether a statute is "content-based" or
"content-neutral.'41
The environment where the speech occurs is also pertinent. For instance,
expression taking place in a traditional public forum such as a park will
receive greater constitutional protection than would speech occurring in a
public nonforum such as a courtroom.42 Some forms of speech fall neatly into
these categories designated by a long line of Supreme Court cases, while
others overlap categories. First Amendment cases involving state regulation
of election processes, including direct democracy procedures, represent a
substantial number of the First Amendment cases of the last quarter century.43
39. During the 1986-1997 sessions, the Court decided approximately 82 cases where
freedom of expression was a central issue. See Burt Neubome, Free Expression and the
Rehnquist Court, in LITIGATION 1998, at 681, 685 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. HO-002B, 1998). This averages to about seven First Amendment cases
per session.
40. In Schenck and its progeny, the Court considered whether the speech at issue
constituted a "clear and present danger" to governmental operations. See COHEN. supra note
38. at 105-24. In contrast, in United States v. O'Brien., the Court set forth a four-part test to
determine whether state regulation of speech will withstand constitutional muster. See United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). The test is applied in circumstances where
regulation is directed at expression composed of both speech and conduct. See RODNEY A.
SMOLLA. SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE FIRST
AMENDMENT § 3.02[4] (1994). The O'Brien test states that: (1) the governmental regulation
must be "within the constitutional power of government:" (2) the regulation must further an
"important or substantial governmental interest;" (3) the governmental interest must be
"unrelated to the suppression of free expression;" and (4) the "incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms" must be "no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest." Id.
41. "Content-based" statutes regulate speech according to the content of the expression.
whereas "content-neutral" statutes regulate factors other than the content of the communication.
such as the "time, place, and manner" in which it occurs. See SMOLLA, supra note 40, §3.01 [2].
Content-based regulation is generally impermissible without a compelling governmental
interest, and such regulations are usually subject to heightened scrutiny. See SMOLLA. supra
note 40. §3.01[2]. In contrast, lower level scrutiny, sometimes referred to as "intermediate
scrutiny," is usually applicable where regulations are content-neutral. See SMOLLA, supra note
40. §3.01[21.
42. See SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 3.02[3].
43. According to one author, 16 of the 82 First Amendment cases decided during
Rehnquist's tenure as Chief Justice have involved election regulations. See Neuborne. supra
note 39. at 703 (citing statistics current through the 1997 session).
[Vol. 22
REGULATING THE ELECTION PROCESS
The convoluted rules and seemingly inconsistent precedent created by these
cases demonstrate their ill fit into the categorical scheme of other First
Amendment cases.
B. First Amendment Challenges to Election Laws
Public political speech is usually the sort of core speech awarded the
highest First Amendment protection;44 however, the Court has long recog-
nized that states have a legitimate interest in regulating the election process.
In one of the earlier election law cases, Rosario v. Rockefeller,45 the Court
upheld a New York law that required voters who wished to vote in primary
elections to register to vote before the general election preceding the
primary. 6 New York voters challenged the law, claiming that it violated their
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.47 The challengers argued that the
law, in effect, disenfranchised them, depriving them of their First Amendment
right to vote in the primary election.48 The State defended the law by claiming
it was necessary to prevent voters from raiding49 the primary of their opposing
party." The Court upheld the law, explaining that although voters who had
not registered before the deadline were somewhat restricted from participating
in primary elections, the State's interest in preventing raiding was sufficiently
compelling to overcome the First Amendment challenge."
As demonstrated in Rosario, states generally argue that their significant
interest in preventing corruption and fraud inherent in elections outweighs
minor restrictions imposed on election-related speech.52 Election speech can
be subdivided into two distinct categories: campaigns aimed at electing
particular candidates and direct democracy initiative campaigns where the
objective is to place an issue before the voters on an upcoming ballot.
44. As a basic guarantee of the First Amendment, the right to participate in expressive
activities such as petitioning the government is usually considered a fundamental right. See
Emily Calhoun, Initiative Petition Reforms andthe First Amendment, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 129,
130(1995).
45. 410 U.S. 752 (1973).
46. See id. at 754.
47. See id. at 756.
48. See id.
49. Raiding occurs when "voters in sympathy with one party designate themselves as
voters of another party so as to influence or determine the results of the other party's primary."
Id. at 760.
50. See id.
51. See Rosario. 410 U.S. at 760-62.
52. See generally SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 9.04.
1999]
UALR LAW REVIEW
1. Regulation of Political Candidate Elections
Election laws regulating third party candidates have spawned many
lawsuits challenging election regulations. States often attempt to control
access to the political arena by third party candidates, sometimes even
excluding them entirely. 3 States have offered as a justification for their
actions the compelling interest of promoting the two party political system. 4
In striking down many of the regulations, the Supreme Court has recognized
the valuable role fulfilled by third parties. 5
Confronted with a challenge to a California statute in effect limiting third
party participation, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the states' right to regulate
the election processes in Storer v. Brown.56 The plaintiffs were independent
candidates for various elected offices. 7 California prohibited any independent
candidate from running for office as an independent if he had participated in
the activities of a major political party within the past year. 8 The candidates
claimed the law violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to
associate with the political party of their choice. 9 In contrast, the State
claimed a legitimate interest in preventing candidates who lost in one primary
from simply filing as a candidate for another party.6"
The Court found that the State's interest in maintaining stable election
processes was compelling and outweighed any inconvenience to independent
candidates.6 ' Limiting independent party candidacy to those who had not
participated in a major party in the past year was, according to the Court, an
effective method of ensuring the integrity of the election process.6" The Court
reasoned that this compelling interest was greater than the interest of a
53. See, e.g., Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666
(1998) (holding that the state owned television station could exclude a third party congressional
candidate from a televised debate).
54. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31-32 (1968).
55. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 794 (1983) (stating that third parties
have historically been "fertile sources of new ideas and new programs; many of their challenges
to the status quo have in time made their way into the political mainstream").
56. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
57. See id. at 727-28.
58. See id. at 726.
59. See id. at 727-28.
60. See id. at 735.
61. See id. at 736. The Court stated, "as a practical matter, there must be a substantial
regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than
chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes." Id. at 730.
62. See Storer, 415 U.S. at 733. The Court compared California's concerns with those of
the Founding Fathers, who were concerned that "splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism
may do significant damage to the fabric of government." Id. at 736.
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candidate who had been involved with an independent party for less than a
year.
6 3
Attempts to regulate election procedures were again challenged on First
Amendment grounds in Buckley v. Valeo.' After the notorious political
scandal of the 1970s involving corruption at the highest levels of government
and ultimately resulting in the resignation of President Richard Nixon,
onlookers demanded some form of campaign finance regulation. Congress
responded to Watergate with the 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act, an
amended version of the 1971 Act.65
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court accepted a plaintiff's contention
that his First Amendment rights were abridged by state regulation of the
election process.66 The Court struck down certain provisions of the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended in 1974.67 While the Court
permitted limitations on individual contributions to campaigns, 6 it found that
electoral candidates possessed a First Amendment right to spend an unlimited
amount on their own campaigns.69 The Court also found that First Amend-
ment principles were infringed by provisions limiting the total amount that
could be spent in a campaign and by provisions limiting the amount any one
person could contribute.7' The Court did uphold, however, the reporting
requirements that mandated disclosure of the names of political action
committees that donated money to campaigns and the amount donated.7'
The Buckley v. Valeo Court found a significant distinction between funds
contributed by outside sources and money deriving from a candidate's own
63. See id. at 734.
64. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
65. See David Schultz, Proving Political Corruption: Documenting the Evidence
Required to Sustain Campaign Finance Reform Laws. 18 REV. LITIG. 85. 91 (1999). The
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 limited the amount any individual or group could
contribute in a single campaign to $1000 and permitted political action committees to donate
up to $5000 in a single campaign. See id. at 93. In addition, the Act restricted the total amount
of one's own money that a candidate could spend. See id.
66. See Buckley. 424 U.S. at 17-23.
67. See id. at 6.
68. See id. at 29.
69. See id. at 50-51. The Court "recognize[d] that political expression and money are
inextricably bound together and that restrictions on campaign spending necessarily curtail, at
the least, the quantity of expression." Arthur N. Eisenberg. Buckley, Rupert Murdoch, and the
Pursuit of Equality in the Conduct of Elections. in 1996 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW
451, 455 (1996).
70. See Buckley. 424 U.S. at 21.
71. See id. at 68. The Court offered three justifications for the disclosure requirements.
One was to inform the electorate about who is funding campaigns. See id. at 66. Another was
to deter corruption by forcing campaign contributors to reveal their identities. See id. at 67.
Finally, the Court reasoned that keeping such records was the best method of detecting
violations of limits imposed on contributions. See id. at 67-68.
1999]
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personal wealth. The compelling factors, such as the prevention of corruption,
that legitimized the regulation of contributions were not as prominent when
dealing with a candidate's expenditures of his own resources.7 -  The
loquacious opinion of Buckley v. Valeo explained why regulation of the
former was constitutionally permissible, while First Amendment concessions
must be made in the regulation of expenditures.
The later case of Anderson v. Celebrezze73 presented another First
Amendment challenge to an election regulation. There, the Court held that
Ohio's early filing deadline imposed on independent party presidential
candidates was unconstitutional under the First Amendment.74 Because tile
early deadline was not applicable to candidates of major parties, the Court
recognized the burden on independent candidates was onerous and contrary
to the First Amendment.75 In addition, the Court stated that the deadline
essentially discriminated against candidates and voters whose views lay
outside the political mainstream.76 The Court criticized the burden imposed
by the State, noting the far-reaching implications caused by one state's laws
in a national election.77 The Court was concerned that the rights of voters
from other states who support that candidate would be affected by the Ohio
law.78
In a more recent case, Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Pary,7 9
independent party candidates challenged a Minnesota law that prohibited
candidates from being listed on an election ballot under more than one
political party." ° The Court recognized that while a political party has the
right to select its own candidates, that right is not absolute.8 The Court
viewed the limitations imposed as insufficient to warrant heightened
72. See Schultz, supra note 65, at 99-100.
73. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
74. See id. at 806. The Court noted "it is especially difficult for the State to justify a
restriction that limits political participation by an identifiable political group whose members
share a particular viewpoint, associational preference. or economic status." Id. at 793.
75. See id. at 805-06. The Court was careful to point out that its primary concern was for
the voters who sought to elect Anderson. not the candidate himself. See id. at 806.
76. See id. at 794.
77. See id. at 795. The Court stated that "the President and Vice President of the United
States are the only elected officials who represent all the voters in the Nation." Id.
78. See id.
79. 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
80. See id. at 356. The practice of listing candidates under various political parties is
known as "fusion" and was prevalent in the past when third parties such as the Populists were
popular. Id.
81. See id. at 358. Several circumstances may prevent a party from nominating the
candidate of its choice, such as the individual's ineligibility or unwillingness to serve, or his
affiliation with and serving as a candidate for another party. See id.
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scrutiny. 2 The Court rejected the notion that parties have a First Amendment
right to select whomever they choose as their candidate." The Court pointed
out that the party members could support their desired candidate even if he
were listed under the name of a different party, thus the right to vote for the
candidate of their choice was not infringed.84 In the Court's view, the process
of placing candidates on a ballot serves the purpose of electing a candidate
rather than as a form of political expression. 5
When balancing the State's interest in protecting ballot integrity and
political stability with the minor burden imposed on the political parties by the
Minnesota law, the Timmons Court found that the former outweighed the
latter.86 Because the Court found that a heightened scrutiny standard was not
necessary tojustify the anti-fusion regulations, the Court accepted the several
justifications offered by the State as sufficient to pass constitutional muster.
87
2. Regulation of Direct Democracy Procedures
Like residents of other states, Colorado citizens have often employed the
processes of direct democracy to implement the laws they want.88 In response,
the State is constantly attempting to control these procedures to prevent fraud
and corruption.89 In Meyer v. Grant,9" the Court struck down Colorado's
prohibition against paying individuals to circulate petitions in initiative
campaigns." The Court unequivocally characterized petition circulation as"core political speech."" The Court stated that the type of speech at issue was
82. See id. at 364.
83. See id. at 359.
84. See id. at 360.
85. See Timmons. 520 U.S. at 363.
86. See id. at 369-70.
87. See id. The Court stated that the State's interests of maintaining ballot integrity and
political stability were "correspondingly weighty" to the minor burdens on the third party
candidates. Id.
88. See generally Collins & Oesterle, supra note 2, at 65-70.
89. See generally Collins & Oesterle, supra note 2, at 65-70.
90. 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
91. See id. at 425-27. Critics of modern direct democracy procedures express dismay over
the practice of paid petition circulation. See John F. Cooper, The Citizen Initiative Petition to
Amend State Constitutions: A Concept Whose Time Has Passed, or a Vigorous Component of
Participatory Democracy at the State Level, 28 N.M. L. REV. 227, 263-64 (1998). Contrary to
the idea that direct democracy is a grassroots form of government by the people, many of the
largest special interest groups in the country often employ petition circulators. See id. at 262.
The National Rifle Association is said to have spent $6,000,000 in one state's referendum over
gun control, while the tobacco industry allegedly spent over $21,000,000 attempting to stop the
tobacco tax from increasing in California. See id.
92. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 422.
1999]
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entitled to First Amendment protection "at its zenith."93  Because of the
fundamental right at issue, the Court utilized exacting scrutiny to balance the
State's interest with the First Amendment rights of those paying petition
circulators.94
After determining the proper standard to apply, the Court held that the
statute forbidding the payment of petition circulators was unconstitutional.95
According to the Court, the number of circulators as well as the size of the
audience reached would be diminished due to the restrictions.96 As a result,
the Court found a decreased likelihood that a petition issue would make it to
the ballot.97 In light of the significant restrictions on political expression, the
Court found the State's burden to be insurmountable.98 In the Meyer Court's
view, the State had not presented a compelling interest to justify the
criminalization of paid petition circulation.99
In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,° an Ohio law prohibiting the
distribution of anonymous campaign literature was struck down. The Court
granted certiorari after the petitioner was fined $100 for distributing flyers
opposing a school levy to be voted on in an upcoming referendum.' The law
prohibited only anonymous literature that was aimed at influencing an
upcoming election.0 2 The Court explained that anonymous authors are
entitled to the same degree of free speech under the First Amendment that
known authors enjoy.0 3 The State, however, attempted to justify the
prohibition by claiming that an author's name provided necessary information
to the reader and that it was necessary to prevent fraud and corruption. 4
93. Id. at 425.
94. See id. at 420.
95. See id. at 428.
96. See id. at 422-23.
97. See id.
98. See Meyer, 486 U.S. at 425.
99. See id. The State claimed that the statute was necessary to prevent fraud and
corruption and to ensure that a petition had the support of a sufficient number of voters. See id.
at 419-20. The State also asserted that because permitting direct democracy petitions was not
constitutionally required, limiting the practice did not violate a constitutional right. See id. at
420.
100. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
101. See id. at 338-41. Mrs. McIntyre actually passed away during the litigation, but the
executor of her estate requested review before the Supreme Court. See id. at 340.
102. See id. at 344.
103. See id. at 342. The Court noted that authors choose to remain anonymous for a variety
of reasons, including fear of retaliation or merely the protection of one's privacy. See id. at 341-
42.
104. See id. at 348.
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The Court rejected the State's argument that it was merely regulating the
election process. 5 The Court found that rather than regulating elections
procedures, Ohio's statute was attempting to regulate pure speech." ° The
Court stated that providing a reader with an author's name simply for the sake
of offering more information about the literature was not a compelling
interest. 7 While preventing fraud and corruption is normally a significant
state interest, the Court held that in this case the justification was not
sufficient.' Because Ohio had other statutes in place that served to prevent
fraud and corruption, this additional restriction was unnecessary to effectuate
its stated purpose."°
The McIntyre Court emphasized the importance of the exchange of ideas
in the political arena, particularly in the context of a controversial
referendum."' After concluding that this type of speech deserves the utmost
First Amendment protection, the Court reiterated the importance of anonymity
in the political sector."' The Court rationalized that although the right to
remain anonymous may sometimes be abused, the value of speech far
outweighs any potential danger of abuse." 2 According to the Court, this idea
lies at the very heart of First Amendment jurisprudence." 3
105. See id. at 345-46.
106. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 345-46.
107. See id. at 348-49.
108. See id. at 349-50.
109. See id. One State statute specifically prohibited "making or disseminating false
statements during political campaigns." McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 349.
I 10. See id. at 347. The Court stated, "[u]rgent, important, and effective speech can be no
less protected than impotent speech, lest the right to speak be relegated to those instances when
it is least needed." Id.
I ll. See id. at 357. The Court considered anonymity to serve as "a shield from the tyranny
of the majority." Id.
112. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357 (citing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
113. See id. According to the Court, the purpose of the First Amendment is "to protect
unpopular individuals from retaliation-and their ideas from suppression-at the hand of an
intolerant society." Id. Direct democracy initiatives are often employed to advance causes
supported by individuals who fall outside the majority, such as women and minorities. See





In Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc.,"14 the
United States Supreme Court held that while state regulation of election
procedures is sometimes warranted, legislatures must proceed with caution to
ensure that core political speech is not unduly burdened." 5 The Court's
analysis began with a discussion of the voter registration requirement imposed
by the Colorado legislature." 6 The Court recognized that limiting the pool of
citizens eligible to circulate petitions to only those citizens who are registered
voters would significantly restrict the number of people capable of effectively
communicating a political message." 7  The State's argument that the
registration requirement is easily fulfilled did not convince the Court, which
reasoned that the failure to register is not always due to apathy." 8 The Court
recognized that many citizens deliberately choose not to register to vote as a
form of political expression." 9
The Court also did not agree with the State's contention that the
registration requirement was necessary to police petitioners. 2' The Court
pointed out that petitioners' names and addresses would be available through
the affidavits each is required to sign. 2 ' Because the State failed to present
a compelling reason to uphold the registration requirement, the Court held that
this requirement was a violation of the First Amendment.'
22
In accord with its previous ruling in McIntyre that the First Amendment
protects anonymous speech,' 23 the Court explained that the identification
badge was also an unnecessary burden on speech.' 24  The Court was
114. 119S.Ct.636(1999).
115. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 642. The Court explained that certain state interests (e.g.,
"administrative efficiency, fraud detection, informing voters") sometimes justify restrictions on
speech. Id.
116. Seeid.at642.
117. See id. at 643. A restriction survives constitutional scrutiny only when necessitated
by a compelling governmental interest. See id. at 642 n. 12.
118. See id. at 644.
119. See id. The Court stated that "the choice not to register [sometimes] implicates
political thought and expression." Id.
120. See id. The State claimed that permitting only registered voters to circulate petitions
would ensure that the circulators could be more easily subpoenaed when necessary for
disciplinary action. See id.
121. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 645.
122. See id.
123. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
124. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 645-46. While striking down the requirement that each
petitioner wear a badge displaying his or her name, the Court did not address whether requiring
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particularly concerned with the fact that advertising one's name while
petitioning enables the public to pair the petitioner's identity with the
sometimes controversial issue being petitioned, possibly subjecting the
petitioner to ridicule and harassment.'25
Again citing to McIntyre, the Court explained that requiring proponents
of initiatives to disclose the names and addresses of petition circulators and
the amount paid to each circulator was contrary to the right to anonymous
speech.'26 Notwithstanding the State's argument that such reports are
necessary to prevent fraud in the petitioning process, the Court expressed
doubt that a paid circulator would be any more likely to commit fraud than a
volunteer.'27 In reaching this conclusion, the Court applied an "exacting
scrutiny" standard which involved balancing the electorate's need to be
informed about the source of campaign funds with the petition proponents'
right to anonymously conduct their core political speech.'28
The Court stressed the fact that although the State did not show sufficient
justification to warrant these restrictions on the initiative process, other
methods remained to serve the State's compelling interest of preventing fraud
and maintaining grassroots support.'29 Specifically, the Court pointed out that
it had not struck down the monthly disclosures of the names of proponents
who were financially supporting each initiative campaign, the total amount
each proponent paid, and which initiatives were supported by paid
circulators. 30 Moreover, although the Court did not specifically discuss each
of the remaining Colorado regulations challenged by ACLF, it affirmed the
Tenth Circuit's approval of the minimum age requirement, the affidavit
requirement, and the six month time-limit on petition circulation.'
petitioners to display their volunteer or paid status and employer when applicable was also an
undue burden, as the Court of Appeals had not ruled on the issue below. See id.
125. See id. The Court referred to Respondent Baraga's claims that he had been harassed
while petitioning for the Hemp Initiative and other claims that citizens who would otherwise
circulate petitions refuse to do so when they are required to wear a name badge. See id.
126. See id. at 646. Like the Tenth Circuit below, the Court did not express an opinion on
the validity of a monthly report including only the names of proponents of petitions, rather than
the actual circulators, and listing all initiatives in which paid circulators participated. See id.
at 647.
127. See id. at 648 (citing Meyer, 486 U.S. at 426).
128. See id. at 647 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I (1976) (per curiam)).
129. See id. at 648.
130. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 648 (citing Valeo, 424 U.S. at 16-17). In addition, the state
of Colorado enforces a requirement that for an initiative to be placed on a ballot, it must be
supported by a number of signatures equal to five percent the number of voters who participated
in the last general election. See id.




In his concurrence, Justice Thomas agreed with the majority's conclusion
but explained that he would apply the more stringent strict scrutiny standard
to the badge, voter registration, and disclosure report requirements because,
in his view, these are significant burdens on core political speech.' 32
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred in part and
dissented in part. 3 O'Connor agreed with the majority's rejection of the
identification badge requirement,'34 but unlike the majority, she believed the
disclosure reports"' and the voter registration requirements"' were permissi-
ble exercises of state regulation over the election process. O'Connor pointed
out that many states require electoral candidates and those circulating petitions
on their behalf to be registered voters.'37 O'Connor argued that requiring
petition circulators to be registered voters was a neutral qualification
analogous to others that had previously been upheld by the Court. 3
Similarly, O'Connor argued that the disclosure requirements were an
acceptable regulation of the electoral process.' 39 She cited to previous cases
where the Court had held such provisions constitutional. 4
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, arguing that all the restrictions
imposed by the Colorado legislature, with the exception of the identification
badge,' 4 ' amounted to constitutionally permissible and legitimate state
regulation of the election process. 42 He argued that regulating the electoral
process is a matter of state concern.143 He expressed concern about the far
reaching effects of the majority's decision, arguing that it would significantly
132. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
133. See id. at 653 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
134. See id. at 654 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). O'Connor
would apply a strict scrutiny standard to the badge requirement, which would necessitate
striking down the requirement as an unwarranted restriction on core political speech. See id.
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
135. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 656 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). O'Connor felt the reports were not direct limits on speech and were necessary to prevent
fraud and to aid in public awareness. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
136. See id. at 654-55 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
137. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
138. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Rosario v.
Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 756-62 (1973); Storer v. Brown. 415 U.S. 724, 728-37 (1974)).
139. See id. at 657 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
140. See id. (O'Connor, ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 60-84 (1976) (per curiam)).
141. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 662 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
142. See id. at 659 (Rehnquist, C.. dissenting).
143. See id. at 661 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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inhibit the state's ability to regulate elections, possibly calling into question
traditionally accepted limitations such as state residency.'"
V. SIGNIFICANCE
The full impact of the Buckley decision remains to be seen, but its
influence is sure to prove substantial for several reasons. First, Buckley
demonstrates the Court's willingness to extend First Amendment protection
into areas traditionally controlled by the states. The power of the states to
regulate many areas that have formerly been accepted as within the parameters
of state control may now be questionable. Buckley makes it clear, however,
that direct democracy procedures such as the initiative petitions at issue are
within the purview of what is considered core political speech, and thus are
entitled to great First Amendment protection.
Because Buckley imposes further restrictions on a state's ability to
regulate direct democracy procedures, as is often the case when state powers
are weakened or otherwise infringed upon by the federal government, the
implications of Buckley may be objectionable on Tenth Amendment
grounds.'45 However, although some critics of Buckley may object due to
Tenth Amendment principles, that argument seems tenuous in light of recent
Tenth Amendment Supreme Court decisions.'46 Whereas recent Tenth
Amendment challenges have successfully struck down federal mandates that
unconstitutionally burdened the states, the Buckley holding does not impose
a similar financial or administrative burden.
A third possible effect of Buckley relates to the growth in the popularity
of the initiative and referendum. The development of active citizen groups
such as the American Constitutional Law Foundation will be encouraged,
which in turn, may create a heightened awareness among the public of the
144. See id. (Rehnquist. C.J., dissenting).
145. For example. Daniel Hays Lowenstein, a professor at the University of California at
Los Angeles and an election law expert, quoted in the Los Angeles Times, stated that -the state
ought to be able to control [its own ballot]." David G. Savage. California and the West Justices
Ease Limits on Ballot Initiatives Government: In Ruling Affecting California U.S. High Court
Says Petition-Gathering Curbs Violate Ist Amendment, L.A. TIMES. Jan. 13. 1999. at A3.
146. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997) (requiring state law
enforcement officers to further federal law by conducting background checks of potential
handgun purchasers violates the Tenth Amendment): New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992) (forcing states to dispose of radioactive waste within state borders violates the Tenth
Amendment). In both Printz and New York, the Court struck down federal mandates due to
unconstitutional burdens they imposed on the states. See generally Daniel S. Herzfeld.
Accountability and the Nondelegation of Unfunded Mandates: A Public Choice Analysis of the




availability of direct democracy devices. Along with an increased use of
direct democracy would be an increased involvement of special interest
groups in the process, who are undeterred by Buckley. Some critics maintain
that Buckley's effect will be to "commercialize" the initiative process. 47 In
contrast, others feel that the commercialization of direct democracy has
already occurred and initiated measures already are a veritable industry
dominated by influential political action committees and professional
petitioners. 48 Ironically, direct democracy, which began as a method of
escaping a government controlled by big business, is now being controlled by
its original enemy.
49
One unfortunate consequence of the Buckley decision is that it causes
further confusion as to the appropriate rule to apply when election regulations
are challenged on First Amendment grounds. The Court's use of terminology
such as "core political speech" that is entitled to First Amendment protection
"at its zenith" raises the question of a possible new heightened category of
speech. 5 ' Just as the Court seemed to be relaxing its standards for state
regulation, Buckley requires a compelling state interest justification for a
state's regulations.'5 ' Buckley muddies the water as to exactly what state
regulations will be permissible in the context of state elections.
Finally, Buckley could have a significant impact on Arkansas." 2 When
faced with scrutiny of their petitioning practices by opponents, future groups
who wish to circulate petitions for ballot proposals can look to the First
Amendment to challenge burdens imposed on the circulation process.
Supporters of proposed constitutional amendments such as Amendment 4 will
147. See Savage. supra note 145, at A3. California state officials predicted that Buckley
would result in the commercialization of the initiative process and more expensive ballot
campaigns. See Savage, supra note 145, at A3.
148. See Joan Biskupic. High Court Rejects Curbs on Ballot Initiatives, WASH. POST. Jan.
13, 1999, at AO1.
149. See Savage, supra note 145, at A3.
150. Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 639-40.
151. Cf Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997). Timmons is a
relatively recent Supreme Court case where the Court upheld Minnesota's election regulation
prohibiting fusion candidates. See id. It appears increasingly difficult to predict whether the
Court will hold that any given statute will withstand constitutional scrutiny and which standard
of review will apply. Timmons employed a lower standard, whereas the Buckley Court utilized
an exacting standard.
152. The initiative has a long history in Arkansas, dating back to 1911. See Timothy J.
Kennedy, Initiated Constitutional Amendments in Arkansas: Strolling Through the Mine Field,
9 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK. L.J. 1, 4 (1986-87). An average of two constitutional amendments are
placed on the ballot each general election, while about half are adopted by the electorate. See
Stephen B. Niswanger, A Practitioner's Guide to Challenging and Defending Legislatively
Proposed Constitutional Amendments in Arkansas. 17 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 765, 772
(1995).
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Supporters of proposed constitutional amendments such as Amendment 4 will
have one extra argument for ammunition to attack regulations imposed by the
State. "'3 Merely reciting the state interest of preventing fraud and corruption
may no longer be sufficient for state regulations to prevail. Initiative
proponents such as those who wish to eliminate the property tax may
confidently assert their First Amendment rights the next time their petitioning
efforts are jeopardized by an "eleventh hour" challenge.
Jennifer Modersohn"
153. See Roberts v. Priest, 334 Ark. 503, 975 S.W.2d 850 (1998).
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